We now have two Palestinian statelets, Gaza and the West Bank (WB). Gaza is under Hamas control and WB substantially under Fatah control. No-one wants two Palestinian states.
When seeking to make sense of what is happening, it is important to remember that neither Hamas nor Fatah are unified groups and that there are several fringe groups making trouble as well as criminals smuggling and stealing. Furthermore, there is very weak leadership in Israel, the WB and the US.
Possible developments
Gaza
My first reaction was that Hamas would seek to show how they could bring law and order to Gaza and run it efficiently. If the political and pragmatic wing of Hamas had its way, there would be no attacks on Israel from Gaza, but it was by no means clear that Hamas could control all the Gaza splinter groups. Presumably Hamas wished to avoid giving the Israelis a pretext to invade: conversely, Israel presumably wished to avoid such an invasion.
However, recent statements by Hamas members and Israeli actions suggest an even more dangerous scenario. Hitherto, the Palestinian leadership has sought to create an independent, secular state. Hamas (both wings) seek to create an Islamic caliphate and Gaza is only the beginning. This transcends the national agenda. Hamas, which derives from the Muslim Brotherhood, will seek to extend the caliphate to the West Bank and to Egypt. Thus the battle lines being drawn are Islamism versus a Palestine nation.
We are already seeing the beginning of the imposition of Islamic rules. Sheikh Nizar Rayyan said on 14 June that the conflict was between Islam and apostasy, closing the era of secularism and atheism in Gaza. The next day, Sheikh Ismael Hannieh said that the Palestine Authority security force ‘prisoners’ should be dealt with according to “the Islamic tolerance rules”, ie those who did not kill Hamas fighters should not be killed. Action is apparently being taken against internet cafés and women not wearing scarves.
Israel appears to be preparing itself for the possibility of another ‘war’ against Hamas to try to prevent an Islamic caliphate being established in Gaza and, even more seriously, in the WB and Egypt.
Further desperate poverty will lead to more frustration and violence against Israel, but a successful Hamas administration in Gaza will help it take control of the WB. For the moment Israel and the West seek to weaken Hamas in Gaza and demonstrate to the Palestinians that Hamas is not a viable alternative government and that violence and extremism will lead them nowhere. The people will continue to suffer but not to starve: there will be sufficient humanitarian aid to avoid that, but little more. Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) is likely to be treated as a head of state and most of the Arab world will boycott Hamas. This tactic could possibly succeed provided that Israel makes serious concessions to Abu Mazen. This is by no means certain nor is it certain that Abu Mazen is capable of showing the necessary leadership.
The EU will continue with its aid (around €1 billion per annum). The international community is likely to insist on more humanitarian aid, but Israel will be concerned to prevent arms being smuggled in the necessary supply convoys entering Gaza. There are no signs yet that Israel will allow the Gaza frontiers to be opened. There needs to be an international surveillance force ensuring the passage of humanitarian aid but preventing the smuggling of arms: sadly, such a force is not likely to be forthcoming
However, Gaza is not a viable entity and will require permanent funding at a much higher level. Whether Hamas will procure ongoing funds from Iran (bearing in mind that Hamas is Sunni) and the Arab world remains to be seen. Iran and Syria continue to have an interest in destabilising the region to divert from their own troubles and their not-so-friendly intentions in Iraq and Lebanon.
West Bank
The WB is currently controlled by Fatah but there is no certainty that Fatah will effectively organise law and order. The new ‘Palestinian’ government, composed of Fatah and independents, means that Israeli and foreign funds will to be released.
It is likely that Hamas will promote unrest but delay a major campaign to take over control of the WB until their plans for Gaza show results. Their aim is surely to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, by showing that they can impose law and order, act efficiently and without corruption. Needless to say, a WB controlled by Hamas would be very dangerous indeed for Israel.
The other forces
Arab World
Regrettably, no decisive action is to be expected. More ominously, the situation in Egypt is worsening. 79 year-old Hosni Muburak does not wish to hand over power and, in any case, there is nobody to hand it over to. Egypt is unstable and may well be the venue of the next uprising.
Israel
Israel will avoid returning to Gaza, but that does not exclude military attacks. There is a separation wall between Gaza and Israel, which prevents suicide bombers. If rockets continue to be fired from Gaza, Israel will presumably retaliate with punitive bombing but not necessarily with troops.
Israel is supporting the new Palestinian government, so as to assist Fatah in demonstrating that Hamas does not have the solution. However, the Israeli settlements, fence and check-points are a constant reminder of Israeli ‘occupation’ and only hopes of a peace settlement can possibly keep Hamas in check. And those hopes have seriously receded.
Israel’s WB policy has succeeded and it can, at the moment, safely ignore the US and the Quartet whose contributions remains feeble.
United States
No change of (non-) policy is likely before 2009.
European Union
This is an opportunity for the EU to show some united leadership. Should it? Can it? First, consideration must be given to what its policy might be. It has no choice but to accept the fait accompli in Gaza. It should ensure that a humanitarian catastrophe is avoided. The EU should propose an international police force, but it won’t.
In the WB, the EU should do all it can, and bring what pressure it can to help the WB government, including releasing all funds due, while ensuring that they are properly used. However, this is only in the short-term. It is hard to imagine that Abu Mazen and Fatah can suddenly be transformed into an effective government, even without ongoing disruptive Hamas activity in the WB.
The Palestinan people are still likely to favour Hamas and blame the crisis on Israel and the West. EU statements and action have given the impression of broad alignment with Israel and the US. The only way to change Palestinian attitudes would be the prospects of real and lasting peace and a separate Palestinian state, beginning with the dismantlement of settlements. This remains a dream.
There is no point in condemning Israel’s settlement policy at this point, but at least pressure should be applied to ease check-point procedures. In my view, the biggest single factor militating against peace and ensuring an eventual conflagration has been Israel’s continuing to build and militarily protect settlements.
The EU can show leadership, but only if Merkel, Sarkozy or Brown show determination. It is hard to imagine that Merkel or Brown will take the lead. Sarkozy’s first priority is domestic reform and he is unlikely, therefore, to take the initiative unless it helps him domestically. And any action risks being a double-edged sword, bearing in mind that perhaps 5 000 000 Muslims and 750 000 Jews live in France. So no early change in EU ‘policy’ can be expected.
Conclusion
The events in Gaza follow naturally from the sterile Israeli, US, EU and UN policies. There is no hope of a lasting settlement between Hamas and Fatah. There is a fundamental doctrinal difference in their respective aims (Islamist v secular) and the brutality of the recent fighting will not be forgotten or forgiven by either. Thus there will be a fight between Hamas and Fatah to the end.
The context has now changed, with Palestine becoming the most dangerous field for the Islamist v secularist battle in the Muslim world and has brought Iran and Syria even more into the arena. How Islamism develops in Gaza will be a model which could well apply elsewhere, beginning with the WB and Egypt.
I have always believed it was a monumental error to decide to boycott the democratically-elected Palestine government without waiting to see its composition and action. We should have talked to ministers, qua ministers and not qua Hamas. We must again decide whether or not to talk to Hamas. No solution is possible without them, but reversing our policy would be exploited by Hamas as proving that violence is the only effective means. As Abba Eban said, peace can only be achieved by talking to your enemies. However, it is now questionable whether there is any point in talking to Hamas. The Israel/Palestine dispute has become subordinated to the greater wider struggle engulfing the Muslim world, which can only be resolved from within.
The best that everyone can do is to try and help Abu Mazen without inflating hope and without plunging into long-term negotiations
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